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NOTE
Punishment but Not a Penalty?
Punitive Damages Are Impermissible Under
Foreign Substantive Law
Paul A. Hoversten*
It is a well-established principle that no court applies the penal laws of an-
other sovereign. But what exactly is a penal law? According to Judge Cardozo,
a penal law effects “vindication of the public justice” rather than “reparation
to one aggrieved.” Although courts have historically treated punitive damages
as a purely civil remedy, that attitude has shifted over time. Modern American
punitive damages serve not to compensate the plaintiff but to punish the de-
fendant on behalf of the whole community. Therefore, when courts rely on
foreign substantive law to impose punitive damages, they arguably violate the
well-established principle that no court applies the penal laws of another sov-
ereign. This Note argues that punitive damages are penal in the choice-of-law
sense, and state courts violate the penal exception when they impose punitive
damages under or alongside foreign substantive law. It proposes several possi-
ble means to resolve this dissonance and ultimately concludes that courts
should altogether eliminate the prospect of punitive damages when they im-
pose liability under foreign substantive law.
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Introduction
“The Courts of no country execute the penal laws of another . . . .”1
When a broken rule results in punishment, the authority to punish be-
longs to the person or entity who owns the rule.2 You don’t punish your
neighbor’s child for staying up past bedtime in her own house while her
parents are home. She’s not your child, it’s not your house, and most impor-
tantly, it’s not your rule.
Courts behave the same way. State courts routinely apply other states’
substantive law in civil cases, but they never apply foreign penal law.3 A
Wisconsin court will not hold a defendant criminally liable under a Minne-
sota statute. Either it will punish the defendant under Wisconsin law or it
will not punish her at all. Courts’ refusal to apply foreign penal law extends
beyond the criminal context; it extends to civil penalties as well.4
This principle is grounded in part in norms of fairness to defendants
and the legitimacy of punishment.5 States can exercise coercive power on
behalf of the entire community in a way that individuals cannot.6 The peo-
ple of Wisconsin, for instance, have conceded to their government the au-
thority to make laws, prosecute them, adjudicate guilt, and punish the
guilty.7 They consent to the prosecution, by the state of Wisconsin, of
1. The Antelope, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 66, 123 (1825).
2. See John Locke, Two Treatises of Government 126–27 (Thomas I. Cook ed.,
Hafner Publ’g Co. 1947) (1690) (explaining that, in nature, each person is responsible for
punishing wrongs committed against herself); id. at 163–64 (explaining that, in society, the
state has exclusive authority to punish violations of its own laws).
3. See infra Section I.B. Throughout this Note, the term “foreign” describes laws, courts,
and people from not only other countries but also other states.
4. See Wisconsin v. Pelican Ins. Co., 127 U.S. 265, 290 (1888) (“The rule that the courts
of no country execute the penal laws of another applies not only to prosecutions and sentences
for crimes and misdemeanors, but to all suits in favor of the state for the recovery of pecuniary
penalties . . . .”).
5. Cf. Small v. United States, 544 U.S. 385, 389–94 (2005) (declining to recognize a
conviction in a Japanese court for purposes of a multiple-conviction penalty, explaining that
foreign legal systems are sometimes “inconsistent with an American understanding of fair-
ness”); Huntington v. Atrill, 146 U.S. 657, 672 (1892) (“It would be a manifest incongruity for
one sovereignty to punish a person for an offence committed against the laws of another
sovereignty.” (quoting Ex parte Bridges, 4 F. Cas. 98, 105 (C.C.N.D. Ga. 1875) (No. 1,862))).
6. Corey Brettschneider, The Rights of the Guilty: Punishment and Political Legitimacy,
35 Pol. Theory 175, 183 (2007).
7. See, e.g., Wis. Const. art. IV, § 1; id. art. VI, §§ 1, 3; id. art. VII, § 8; id. art. XIV, § 1.
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wrongs that violate the laws of Wisconsin.8 As a condition of that concession
of authority, the people demand certain procedural protections for actual
and would-be defendants, among them notice of laws and trial by a jury of
peers in the community.9 The people of Wisconsin, however, have not con-
sented to prosecution of wrongs that violate Minnesota’s laws, which they
played no role in enacting. Such a prosecution or punishment would breach
the social contract that the people of Wisconsin have made with their gov-
ernment. It would violate basic norms of notice and fairness to defendants,
and any ensuing punishment would be illegitimate.10 In general, therefore,
courts decline to apply the penal laws of another sovereign.11
It is not hard to understand why an out-of-state defendant would feel
uneasy at the prospect of punishment by a foreign court or judgment by a
foreign jury. Former Chief Justice Neely of the West Virginia Supreme Court
of Appeals quipped,
As long as I am allowed to redistribute wealth from out-of-state companies
to injured in-state plaintiffs, I shall continue to do so. Not only is my sleep
enhanced when I give someone else’s money away, but so is my job secur-
ity, because the in-state plaintiffs, their families, and their friends will re-
elect me.12
Justice Neely was being wry, but it is true that out-of-state defendants
often find themselves in hostile courtrooms. One scholar has found that
“[s]tate court judges are about twice as likely to choose law that favors the
plaintiff if the plaintiff is local and the defendant is out-of-state” than in the
inverse situation.13 Other scholars have discovered that in states where judges
are appointed, damages awards are almost twice as large when the defendant
8. See Jean-Jacques Rousseau, The Social Contract & Discourses 30–31 (Ernest
Rhys ed., G.D.H. Cole trans., J.M. Dent & Sons 1920) (1762); cf. Brettschneider, supra note 6,
at 183 (“[C]rimes prosecuted by the state are considered to be controversies between ‘the
people’ and the accused individual.”).
9. See, e.g., Wis. Const. art. I, §§ 5, 7–8, 12.
10. See Rousseau, supra note 8, at 29 (“[A]n act of Sovereignty . . . is legitimate [ ]
because [it is] based on the social contract . . . .”); cf. Small, 544 U.S. at 401–02 (recognizing
that convictions in some foreign legal systems are “inconsistent with an American understand-
ing of fairness”).
11. But see The S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), Judgment, 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10 (Sept. 7).
The Lotus case suggests that sovereign states can freely exercise criminal jurisdiction outside
their own territory unless they specifically agree to constrain themselves. Id. at 19. But even if
application of foreign penal law would not violate international law in a strict sense, it would
nevertheless be “unjust” and “contrary to the comity of nations.” See Am. Banana Co. v.
United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 356 (1909).
12. Richard Neely, The Product Liability Mess: How Business Can Be Rescued
from the Politics of State Courts 4 (1988). After reprinting this quotation out of context,
the ABA Journal clarified, “In the context, Neely was using an ironic style to mimic the unspo-
ken rationale he feels some judges use to rule for plaintiffs. The quote does not reflect Neely’s
personal position on the matter, and the Journal regrets inadvertently distorting his views.” 75
A.B.A. J., Jan. 1989, at 32.
13. Daniel Klerman, Are State Courts Biased? Evidence from Choice of Law 2 (Aug. 30,
2016) (unpublished manuscript), http://www.law.columbia.edu/sites/default/files/microsites/
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was from out of state.14 There is an even greater disparity in states where
judges are elected.15
If out-of-state defendants already face hostile judges and juries, then the
availability of punitive damages16 significantly multiplies the effect of that
hostility. The Supreme Court has stated that “[punitive damages] are specifi-
cally designed to exact punishment in excess of actual harm to make clear
that the defendant’s misconduct was especially reprehensible.”17 One scholar
has explained that punitive damages “may have a retributive or expressive
function, designed to embody social outrage at the actions of serious wrong-
doers.”18 The opportunity to impose punitive damages is an invitation to the
jury to express “moral condemnation”19 of the (already-vulnerable) Vikings
fan in Packers’ territory.
Even when defendants are at home, however, it is still incongruous for a
state court to impose punitive damages based on another state’s substantive
law. If punitive damages are meant to punish guilty defendants and each
state is uniquely responsible for punishing violations of its own laws, then it
is unusual for a jury to “morally condemn” even its own defendant for her
violation of another state’s law. This is equivalent to punishing your own
child for violating your neighbor’s bedtime rule.
Nevertheless, state courts do impose punitive damages under foreign
law, and juries do use foreign states’ laws to express their own “social out-
rage”20 at out-of-state defendants and out-of-state torts. For example, in
Wooley v. Lucksinger,21 the Louisiana Supreme Court approved a $45.5 mil-
lion punitive damage award against a Texas HMO, over and above a com-
pensatory damage award of $44.54 million.22 The Louisiana trial court in
law-economics-studies/klermand._state_court_bias_2016-08-30.pdf [https://perma.cc/SQL4-
E3ZM].
14. Alexander Tabarrok & Eric Helland, Court Politics: The Political Economy of Tort
Awards, 42 J.L. & Econ. 157, 163 (1999) (finding that damages awards are about $219,980
greater than average in such cases).
15. Id. (finding that damages awards are $364,950 greater than average in such cases).
16. Various terms, including “punitive,” “exemplary,” and “vindictive” damages, gener-
ally refer to the same concept. Note, Exemplary Damages in the Law of Torts, 70 Harv. L. Rev.
517, 517 (1957). This Note uses the term “punitive damages” throughout.
17. Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Grp., Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 432 (2001) (altera-
tion in original) (quoting Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 54 (1991) (O’Connor,
J., dissenting)).
18. Cass R. Sunstein et al., Assessing Punitive Damages (with Notes on Cognition and Val-
uation in Law), 107 Yale L.J. 2071, 2075 (1998).
19. Cooper, 532 U.S. at 432.
20. Sunstein et al., supra note 18, at 2075.
21. 61 So. 3d 507 (La. 2011).
22. Lucksinger, 61 So. 3d at 549. The jury initially awarded $52.4 million in compensa-
tory damages and $65 million in punitive damages. The judge reduced those awards by 15 and
30 percent, respectively. Id.
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Wooley applied Texas substantive law to the entire case, including the puni-
tive damages portion, even though Louisiana does not ordinarily permit pu-
nitive damages at all.23
As a more modest example, in Kammerer v. Western Gear Corp.,24 the
Washington Supreme Court approved a judgment of $350,000 in punitive
damages ($600,000 total damages) for contract fraud under California law.25
The contract was negotiated, finalized, and performed in California.26 The
dissent cited an “unbroken line” of thirty-seven cases27 and a series of failed
legislative efforts28 affirming that, under Washington law, “the doctrine of
punitive damages is deemed ‘unsound in principle, and unfair and danger-
ous in practice.’ ”29 Nevertheless, the defendant in Kammerer listened as a
Washington jury expressed its own “moral condemnation” through a Cali-
fornia statute30 for conduct that occurred in California, even though the
jury’s own law would never have allowed it.
State courts refuse to impose criminal sanctions and civil penalties
under other states’ laws, but most courts show no compunction about bor-
rowing foreign law to impose punitive damages. This Note argues that puni-
tive damages are penal and that state courts violate fundamental choice-of-
law principles when they impose punitive damages under foreign substan-
tive law.31 Part I traces the history and purpose of punitive damages and
outlines basic choice-of-law principles at play in civil cases in American
courts. Part II argues that punitive damages are penal in the interstate
choice-of-law sense and that courts violate the penal exception when they
impose punitive damages under or alongside foreign substantive law. Part III
considers several possible solutions to the problem and ultimately concludes
that state courts should wholly reject punitive damages when they impose
liability under foreign substantive law.
23. Id. at 567.
24. 635 P.2d 708 (Wash. 1981).
25. Kammerer, 635 P.2d at 710, 713.
26. Id. at 710.
27. Id. at 715 n.2 (Stafford, J., dissenting).
28. Id. at 715 n.3.
29. Id. at 715 (quoting Spokane Truck & Dray Co. v. Hoefer, 25 P. 1072, 1075 (Wash.
1891)).
30. The modern version of this statute is Cal. Civ. Code § 3294 (West 2016).
31. There are many other closely related issues that this Note does not squarely address,
including limitations on punitive damages for excessiveness, enforceability of judgments from
state to state, choice of law in federal and international courts, and the public policy exception
to the application of foreign substantive law. This Note narrowly addresses punitive damages
in state courts when those courts do not apply their own substantive law to the merits of the
case.
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I. Overview: Punitive Damages and Choice of Law
The doctrine of punitive damages is an anomaly in the law.32 It straddles
the line between tort and criminal law33—it simultaneously contemplates
private wrongs to individuals and widespread injuries to the public. Profes-
sors Prosser and Keeton explain that, with respect to punitive damages, “the
ideas underlying the criminal law have invaded the field of torts.”34 But this
becomes an uncomfortable mixture when courts apply other states’ substan-
tive laws to the merits of the case. After all, it is a well-accepted rule that
courts do not apply foreign penal laws.35 This Part places punitive damages
and choice-of-law analysis in context, setting the stage for further argument.
Section I.A traces the history and purpose of punitive damages in England
and the United States. Section I.B briefly examines American choice-of-law
theories and methods in the context of punitive damages.
A. History and Purpose of Punitive Damages in English
and American Law
Punitive damages appeared in common law cases in the late eighteenth
century,36 but the underlying purpose of the practice was not clear. In 1763,
in Wilkes v. Wood, a newspaper publisher alleged that King George’s secre-
tary of state had committed trespass when he issued a general search warrant
without any formal information and without listing any charges.37 The de-
fendant’s lawyer contended that in no prior case had a civil plaintiff argued
32. See W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts § 2, at 9
(5th ed. 1984) (“In one rather anomalous respect, however, the ideas underlying the criminal
law have invaded the field of torts.”).
33. Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Grp., Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 432 (describing
punitive damages as “quasi-criminal”) (quoting Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1,
19 (1991)).
34. Keeton et al. supra note 32, § 2, at 9. In conversation, Professor Mathias Reimann
has pointed out to me that Prosser and Keeton might be mistaken. In his telling, the common
law historically treated civil and criminal cases as part of a unified body of law and, therefore,
punitive damages fit naturally in the common law system. Regardless of their provenance,
though, punitive damages occupy a strange place in modern American law, somewhere be-
tween private law and public law.
35. The Antelope, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 66, 123 (1825).
36. 1 John J. Kircher & Christine M. Wiseman, Punitive Damages: Law and Prac-
tice § 1:01, at 2 (2d ed. 2000). Societies around the world have employed legal concepts simi-
lar to punitive damages throughout history. The Code of Hammurabi, the Hindu Code of
Manu, and the Mosaic Law all provided for multiple-damage remedies in some contexts.
James B. Sales & Kenneth B. Cole, Jr., Punitive Damages: A Relic that Has Outlived Its Origins,
37 Vand. L. Rev. 1117, 1119 (1984). Roman law also provided for punitive damages in civil
disputes. Michael Rustad & Thomas Koenig, The Historical Continuity of Punitive Damages
Awards: Reforming the Tort Reformers, 42 Am. U. L. Rev. 1269, 1285–86 (1992). But the con-
cept does not appear in English case reporters until the late eighteenth century. 1 Kircher &
Wiseman, supra, § 1:01, at 2.
37. Wilkes v. Wood (1763) 98 Eng. Rep. 489, 490, 495; Lofft 1, 2, 12; see 1 Kircher &
Wiseman, supra note 36, § 1:01, at 2; see also Huckle v. Money (1763) 95 Eng. Rep. 768, 768; 2
Wils. 206, 206 (a complement case).
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“the cause of all the good people of England.”38 But that argument did not
deter the court from approving the jury’s “large and exemplary”39 damage
award of £1,000.40 Lord Chief Justice Pratt reasoned, “[A] jury have it in
their power to give damages for more than the injury received. Damages are
designed not only as a satisfaction to the injured person, but likewise as a
punishment to the guilty, to deter from any such proceeding for the future,
and as a proof of the detestation of the jury to the action itself.”41
Another eighteenth-century English case, however, puts pressure on that
theory of punitive damages. In Duberley v. Gunning,42 in 1792, the Court of
King’s Bench upheld a jury’s award of £5,000 for a verdict of “criminal con-
versation,”43 at least in part because the nature of the tort made it impossible
to measure actual, pecuniary damages.44 “[I]n a case like the present, where
the spirit is principally wounded, and the future happiness of the sufferer
destroyed, there is no standard by which the Judges can ascertain the excess
of the damages given . . . .”45 On this theory, the £5,000 award was commen-
surate with the plaintiff’s injury, though obviously in excess of his actual,
pecuniary harm.
This confusion made its way across the Atlantic, and throughout the
nineteenth century, American courts and scholars equivocated on the moti-
vating purpose of punitive damages.46 If the court in Wilkes was right, then
punitive damages serve not to compensate the plaintiff but to punish the
defendant and deter similar conduct.47 In that sense, punitive damages sat-
isfy the injury not of the individual plaintiff but of an entire community.48
Alternatively, if the Duberley court was right, then punitive damages merely
38. Wilkes, 98 Eng. Rep. at 493.
39. Id. at 498.
40. Id. at 499.
41. Id. at 498–99.
42. Duberley v. Gunning (1792) 100 Eng. Rep. 1226; 4 T.R. 652.
43. “A tort action for adultery, brought by a husband against a third party who engaged
in sexual intercourse with his wife.” Criminal Conversation, Black’s Law Dictionary (10th
ed. 2014).
44. See Duberly, 100 Eng. Rep. at 1226–27.
45. Id. at 1226; see also Merest v. Harvey (1814) 128 Eng. Rep. 761, 761; 5 Taunt. 442,
442 (“Suppose a gentleman has a paved walk in his paddock, before his window, and that a
man intrudes and walks up and down before the window of his house, and looks in while the
owner is at dinner, is the trespasser to be permitted to say, ‘here is a halfpenny for you, which
is the full extent of all the mischief I have done?’ Would that be a compensation? I cannot say
that it would be.” (emphasis added)).
46. See generally Rustad & Koenig, supra note 36, at 1284–1303 (discussing the transat-
lantic historical development of punitive damages); Sales & Cole, supra note 36, at 1120–24
(examining how American courts adopted punitive damages and the justifications for them
from English courts); Note, supra note 16, at 517–20 (discussing the historical development of
punitive damages and the “century of controversy” over them). See also Fay v. Parker, 53 N.H.
342 (1872), for a thorough examination of English and American case law on this question.
47. See Wilkes v. Wood (1763) 98 Eng. Rep. 489, 498–99; Lofft 1, 18–19.
48. See id. (arguing that punitive damages reflect “proof of the detestation of the jury to
the action itself”).
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compensate the plaintiff for invisible or nonpecuniary injury.49 So-called
“punitive” damages, then, are nothing special; they are not really punitive at
all. They simply serve to make the plaintiff whole.
Over time, American courts settled on Lord Chief Justice Pratt’s punish-
ment-and-deterrence theory in Wilkes. In 2001, the U.S. Supreme Court de-
cided Cooper Industries, Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc. and sharply
distinguished between compensatory and punitive damages:
[Compensatory damages] are intended to redress the concrete loss that the
plaintiff has suffered by reason of the defendant’s wrongful conduct. [Pu-
nitive damages], which have been described as “quasi-criminal,” operate as
“private fines” intended to punish the defendant and to deter future wrong-
doing. A jury’s assessment of the extent of a plaintiff’s injury is essentially a
factual determination, whereas its imposition of punitive damages is an
expression of its moral condemnation.50
The Court further explained that, because American notions of compensa-
tory damages have expanded to include intangible, nonpecuniary harms
(like pain and suffering), “the theory behind punitive damages has shifted
toward a more purely punitive (and therefore less factual) understanding.”51
Whatever the original purpose of punitive damages, they are now a weapon
of the polity, entrusted to civil juries, to express “social outrage”52 at the
actions of guilty defendants.
B. Choice of Law and Punitive Damages in American Courts
Punitive damages doctrine becomes complicated when courts apply for-
eign substantive law. Courts regularly apply other states’ substantive law to
civil cases when the circumstances call for it.53 For instance, if a driver from
Illinois crashes into a driver from Kentucky in Iowa and the victim sues in
Illinois, the court would have to choose which state’s law to apply. But that
doesn’t mean that courts abandon their own state law altogether.
49. See Duberley, 100 Eng. Rep. at 1226.
50. 532 U.S. 424, 432 (2001) (emphasis added) (citations omitted). The Court also cited
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.: “[Punitive damages] are . . . levied by civil juries to punish repre-
hensible conduct and to deter its future occurrence.” 418 U.S. 323, 350 (1974).
51. Cooper, 532 U.S. at 437 n.11. For a more detailed explanation of this theoretical
evolution, see Benjamin C. Zipursky, Palsgraf, Punitive Damages, and Preemption, 125 Harv.
L. Rev. 1757, 1777–84 (2012).
52. Sunstein et al., supra note 18, at 2075 (“[P]unitive damages may have a retributive or
expressive function, designed to embody social outrage at the actions of serious
wrongdoers.”).
53. Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 6 (Am. Law Inst. 1971). In tort
cases, for instance, about twenty-four states follow the Second Restatement approach, ten fol-
low the traditional place-of-the-wrong approach, five follow the “better law” approach, three
follow the “significant contacts” approach, two follow the “interest analysis” approach, and six
follow some combination of approaches (these data include the District of Columbia and
Puerto Rico). Symeon C. Symeonides, Choice of Law in the American Courts in 2016: Thirtieth
Annual Survey, 65 Am. J. Comp. L. 1, 33 tbl.2 (2017).
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Even when a court applies another state’s substantive law, there are sev-
eral circumstances under which it will decline to follow that law on narrower
questions presented within a given case. First, a court will apply its own
procedural law in almost all circumstances.54 Second, a court might choose to
split up the issues presented in the case and determine, for instance, that
Kentucky law is more appropriate for some issues but Iowa law is more
appropriate for others.55 This practice is known as de´pec¸age (French for “dis-
memberment”).56 Finally, a court will not apply another state’s penal laws.57
The Supreme Court enunciated the rule against applying foreign penal
laws in the 1825 case The Antelope.58 Chief Justice Marshall stated, “The
Courts of no country execute the penal laws of another.”59 That is, state-
imposed punishment is left to the state responsible for punishing. By anal-
ogy, there is generally no choice-of-law question for criminal cases—which-
ever court has jurisdiction also applies its own law.60 This principle generally
extends to civil penalties.61 For example, California law imposes civil penal-
ties on anyone who knowingly emits air contaminants without permission
54. See Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 122 (Am. Law Inst. 1971).
55. See, e.g., Haumschild v. Cont’l Cas. Co., 95 N.W.2d 814 (Wis. 1959) (applying Cali-
fornia law to the question of negligence and Wisconsin law to the question of interspousal
immunity).
56. “A court’s application of different state laws to different issues in a legal dispute;
choice of law on an issue-by-issue basis.” De´pec¸age, Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014).
57. The Antelope, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 66, 123 (1825). For a nonexhaustive list of reasons
courts might give for avoiding foreign law, see Symeon C. Symeonides, Choice of Law 68–86
(2016).
58. 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) at 123.
59. Id. This case has a complex factual and legal background, involving questions of
property, piracy, and slavery in the early nineteenth century. See id. at 66–68. For our pur-
poses, this is what matters: in 1819 and 1820, a privateer had captured more than 280 enslaved
people at sea, off the coast of Africa. Id. at 67–68, 129. The slave trade, though not slavery
itself, had been declared illegal in the United States. Id. at 106–07. Spain and Portugal had
declared the slave trade illegal only north of the equator. Id. at 79. Because most of the en-
slaved people had been initially captured south of the equator, ostensibly from Spanish and
Portuguese owners, the vice consuls of Spain and Portugal argued that the enslaved people
were Spanish and Portuguese property and that they should be awarded to the Spanish and
Portuguese vice consuls. Id. at 67–68. The ship carrying the enslaved people, called the Ante-
lope, was captured by a United States naval officer off the coast of Florida, id. at 123–24, which
was Spanish territory at the time. Spanish law prohibited the slave trade north of the equator,
id. at 79, including in Florida, and presumably, if the captain of the Antelope had been held
liable for violating that prohibition, that would have triggered forfeiture of the property on
that ship to the vice consuls. Although it called the slave trade “abhorrent,” id. at 115, the
Supreme Court declined to enforce the Spanish north-of-the-equator slave-trade prohibition
against the captain of the Antelope, stating that “[t]he Courts of no country execute the penal
laws of another.” Id. at 110, 122–23. It also declined to impose criminal sanctions on the
ground that the slave trade violated the “law of nations.” Id. at 99.
60. Symeonides, supra note 57, at 82 (“Strictly speaking, in the area of criminal law,
there is no choice-of-law question—it is merged into the jurisdictional question.”).
61. Wisconsin v. Pelican Ins. Co., 127 U.S. 265, 290 (1888) (“The rule that the courts of
no country execute the penal laws of another applies not only to prosecutions and sentences
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and fails to take corrective action.62 The penal exception prevents courts in,
say, Arizona from applying that law to hold a civil defendant liable, regard-
less of whether the contaminants were emitted in California, Arizona, or
elsewhere.
The word “penal” is, of course, a term of art in this context. In ordinary
parlance, any adverse action is “penal” in some sense. But as Judge Cardozo
explained in Loucks v. Standard Oil Co. of New York,63 for choice-of-law pur-
poses, a penal statute is “one that awards a penalty to the state, or to a public
officer in its behalf, or to a member of the public, suing in the interest of the
whole community to redress a public wrong.”64 He continued, “The purpose
must be, not reparation to one aggrieved, but vindication of the public
justice.”65
The salient question, then, is whether and to what degree modern puni-
tive damages map on to Judge Cardozo’s conception of penal laws. If puni-
tive damages are not penal, then state courts are free to import other states’
relevant substantive law (when appropriate) to impose them. But if punitive
damages are penal in Judge Cardozo’s sense, then the penal exception ex-
pressed in The Antelope should prevent courts from applying foreign law
with respect to punitive damages altogether.66 In that world, a court could
impose punitive damages only when its choice-of-law analysis pointed to the
law of its own jurisdiction. In other words, punitive damages would be avail-
able only when a court applied its own law.
II. Punitive Damages Are Penal
Cardozo’s articulation of the penal exception is still the modern stan-
dard,67 but it raises as many questions as it answers. By including reference
to nongovernment plaintiffs “suing in the interest of the whole commu-
nity,”68 Cardozo opened the door to classifying certain semiprivate remedies
as penal and, therefore, unenforceable outside the most appropriate jurisdic-
tion. This Part applies Cardozo’s articulation of the penal exception to the
doctrine of punitive damages and argues that punitive damages are penal in
the choice-of-law sense. Section II.A examines Cardozo’s understanding of
for crimes and misdemeanors, but to all suits in favor of the State for the recovery of pecuni-
ary penalties . . . .”).
62. Cal. Health & Safety Code § 42402.2 (West 2014).
63. 120 N.E. 198 (N.Y. 1918).
64. Loucks, 120 N.E. at 198.
65. Id.
66. The penal exception is not rooted in the Constitution, but rather in principles of
comity, international law, and common law. See The Antelope, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 66, 123
(1825); Loucks, 120 N.E. at 198. It has never been held unconstitutional for a court to apply
foreign penal law, but rather it would be inappropriate to apply foreign penal law because it
would violate the well-established principles of comity, international law, and common law.
67. See Symeonides, supra note 57, at 83.
68. Loucks, 120 N.E. at 198.
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punitive damages and the penal exception in the context of modern Ameri-
can tort law. Section II.B considers international attitudes about whether
punitive damages are penal. Section II.C describes certain penal characteris-
tics of modern American punitive damages to argue that they fit comforta-
bly within Cardozo’s articulation of the penal exception.
A. Cardozo’s Penal Framework in the Context of Modern
American Tort Law
In Loucks, Judge Cardozo explained that a statute might be “penal” even
if it does not award fines directly to the state coffers: “[A penal statute] is
one that awards a penalty to . . . a member of the public, suing in the inter-
est of the whole community to redress a public wrong.”69 He might have had
qui tam actions70 in mind, but there are significant implications for punitive
damages in private lawsuits.
There are two problems with applying the Loucks articulation of the
penal exception to punitive damages. First, the Massachusetts statute at issue
in Loucks was arguably a punitive damages statute,71 and Judge Cardozo,
speaking for the New York court, ruled that it was not penal.72 Second, Car-
dozo explicitly called out punitive damages when he described nonpenal
statutes: “The damages may be compensatory or punitive according to the
statutory scheme. In either case the plaintiffs have a grievance above and
beyond any that belongs to them as members of the body politic. They sue
to redress an outrage peculiar to themselves.”73
But this reading reveals an impasse between Judge Cardozo and twenty-
first-century American tort lawyers. Cardozo’s understanding of punitive
damages does not reflect the modern view, expressed in Cooper, that puni-
tive damages are “quasi-criminal,”74 “intended to punish the defendant and
to deter future wrongdoing,”75 and “an expression of [the jury’s] moral con-
demnation.”76 Rather, Cardozo viewed the foreign statute (and perhaps,
“punitive damages” statutes more generally) “not . . . as atonement for a
crime,” but rather as “solace to the individual who has suffered a private
wrong.”77 That is, he viewed the Massachusetts statutory damages as
69. Id.
70. “An action brought under a statute that allows a private person to sue for a penalty,
part of which the government or some specified public institution will receive.” Qui tam Ac-
tion, Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014).
71. It was a wrongful death statute that awarded $500 to $10,000 in damages, commen-
surate with the defendant’s culpability rather than the plaintiff’s loss. Loucks, 120 N.E. at 198
(quoting Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 171, § 2 (1907)).
72. Id. at 199.
73. Id. (citation omitted).
74. Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Grp., Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 432 (2001) (quoting
Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 19 (1991)).
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Loucks, 120 N.E. at 199.
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Duberley damages (compensatory), not Wilkes damages (truly punitive).78
He made his viewpoint clear: “The purpose which informs and vitalizes [the
Massachusetts statute] is the protection of the [decedent’s] survivors.”79
That’s a far cry from Lord Chief Justice Pratt’s framework in Wilkes, in
which “[d]amages are designed not only as a satisfaction to the injured per-
son, but likewise as a punishment to the guilty, to deter from any such pro-
ceeding in the future, and as a proof of the detestation of the jury to the
action itself.”80
Cardozo understood that American tort law was at an inflection point
and that popular conceptions about the law were “developing.”81 For his
part, he rejected the view that private plaintiffs serve on behalf of their
whole communities as private attorneys general. Professor Benjamin Zipur-
sky, in a discussion on Cardozo’s opinion in Palsgraf v. Long Island Railroad
Co.,82 observes,
At the core of a wide variety of tort thinking today is the assumption that a
plaintiff in a tort case is, at least in part, performing a private attorney
general role. Yet when Chief Judge Cardozo reached the “Q.E.D.” moment
of his famous opinion in Palsgraf, he was saying that this is exactly what
should not happen in a tort suit; the plaintiff should not be able to proceed
based on a demonstration that the defendant acted antisocially or wrong-
fully in some general sense or to some third person.83
Thus, the impasse. The modern American view of punitive damages as
“moral condemnation”84 does not align with Cardozo’s view of punitive
damages as “solace to the individual who has suffered a private wrong.”85
Defining a “penal” law, Cardozo stated that its “purpose must be, not
reparation to one aggrieved, but vindication of the public justice.”86 To make
this distinction, consider the role of the jury. In a purely civil, nonpunitive
case, the court asks the jury only to find facts; the jury does not ordinarily
78. See Duberley v. Gunning (1792) 100 Eng. Rep. 1226, 1226; 4 T.R. 652, 652 (“where
the spirit is principally wounded”); Wilkes v. Wood, (1763) 98 Eng. Rep. 489, 498; Lofft 1, 19
(“as a punishment to the guilty”); see also discussion supra Section I.A.
79. Loucks, 120 N.E. at 199.
80. Wilkes, 98 Eng. Rep. at 498–99.
81. See Loucks, 120 N.E. at 199 (“We cannot fail to see in the history of the Massachusetts
statutes a developing expression of . . . policy and purpose. The [wrongful death] statutes have
their distant beginnings in the criminal law. To some extent the vestiges of criminal forms
survive. But the old forms have been filled with a new content.”).
82. 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928).
83. Zipursky, supra note 51, at 1770–71; see also Palsgraf, 162 N.E. at 101 (“The victim
does not sue derivatively, or by right of subrogation, to vindicate an interest invaded in the
person of another. Thus to view his cause of action is to ignore the fundamental difference
between tort and crime. He sues for breach of a duty owing to himself.” (citation omitted)).
84. Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Grp., Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 432 (2001).
85. Loucks, 120 N.E. at 199.
86. Id. at 198.
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express an opinion.87 In a criminal case, by contrast, the jury not only finds
facts but also expresses the “conscience of the community” when it recom-
mends a sentence.88 Whereas the jury in a purely civil, nonpunitive case
merely arbitrates between two private parties, a criminal jury vindicates the
public justice, to use Cardozo’s terms.89
The question, then, is whether a jury’s assessment of punitive damages
is more like a fact (as in a purely civil case) or an opinion (as in a criminal
case). The Supreme Court answered this question definitively in Cooper: “A
jury’s assessment of the extent of a plaintiff’s injury is essentially a factual
determination, whereas its imposition of punitive damages is an expression
of its moral condemnation.”90 Punitive damages are “quasi-criminal”—that
is, they “operate as ‘private fines’ intended to punish the defendant and to
deter future wrongdoing.”91 They convey the community’s “moral condem-
nation” of the bad act.92 The Court could hardly have been more assertive:
modern American punitive damages are penal.
It is troubling, then, to think that a court would empower a jury to
“morally condemn” a defendant under a foreign state’s law. When we ask
jurors to weigh in on punitive damages, we ask them to cross the threshold
from finding facts into expressing “moral condemnation.”93 Punishment is
reserved for the state responsible for punishing. If the jury acts as the “con-
science of the community” where the court sits, then we should not ask
jurors to express the conscience of another community altogether, a com-
munity to which the jurors do not belong.94
87. In some sense, all fact-finding involves an expression of the jury’s opinion. For exam-
ple, in a simple negligence case, the jury expresses an opinion as to whether the defendant
acted reasonably. Here, however, I use the word “opinion” in a stricter sense to refer to the
jury’s belief that the defendant is not merely liable or indebted to the plaintiff as a factual
matter, but that she is shameful to the community as a normative matter. The Supreme Court
made a similar distinction in Cooper. See 532 U.S. at 432.
88. See, e.g., Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 519 (1968); United States v. Lewis,
638 F. Supp. 573, 580 (W.D. Mich. 1986) (“As the lid of a tea kettle releases steam, jury trials
in criminal cases allow peaceful expression of community outrage at . . . vicious criminal
acts.”); see also Jeffrey Abramson, We, the Jury: The Jury System and the Ideal of
Democracy 18 (1994).
89. See Loucks, 120 N.E. at 198.
90. Cooper, 532 U.S. at 432.
91. Id. (quoting Pac. Mut. Ins. Life Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 47 (1991) (O’Connor, J.,
dissenting)).
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. See supra notes 87–88 and accompanying text.
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B. An International Perspective on American Punitive Damages
Several courts in foreign countries have refused to enforce American
punitive damage judgments on the ground that the penal nature of the dam-
ages violated their respective public policies.95 In Doe v. Eckhard Schmitz,96 in
1992, a California court awarded $400,000 in punitive damages (on top of
$350,260 in compensatory damages) to an underage victim of sexual
abuse.97 The defendant absconded to Germany, and the plaintiff asked a
German court to enforce the judgment.98 The German Supreme Court en-
forced the compensatory portion of the judgment, but it refused to enforce
the punitive award.99 According to the German court, “Punitive damages
allow a plaintiff to act as a private-public prosecutor, which interferes with
the state’s monopoly on penalization.”100
To clarify its rationale, the German court explained that American “pu-
nitive damages” might be enforceable in Germany to the extent that they
serve to compensate plaintiffs for intangible, nonpecuniary harm.101 That is,
punitive awards are enforceable if they conform to the Duberley conception
of damages (“where the spirit is principally wounded”)102 but not the Wilkes
conception (“as a punishment to the guilty”).103 Because American punitive
damages are ordinarily “intended to punish the defendant and to deter fu-
ture wrongdoing,”104 German courts seemingly perceive them as penal.
The Italian Supreme Court took a similar position in Parrott v. Fimez in
2005.105 In that case, an Alabama jury awarded $1 million in total damages
to the plaintiff because the defendant had defectively designed a motorcycle
95. Cedric Vanleenhove, A Normative Framework for the Enforcement of U.S. Punitive
Damages in the European Union: Transforming the Traditional ‘¡No Pasara´n!’, 41 Vt. L. Rev.
347, 353–61 (2016) (recounting a German case and an Italian case). Generally, a court’s re-
fusal to enforce a foreign judgment or apply foreign law because it is contrary to public policy
is distinct from a court’s refusal to enforce a judgment or apply a law because it is penal. See
Symeonides, supra note 57, at 75–78. But here, the distinction makes no difference. In the
cases described in this Section, the public policy exception and the penal exception are func-
tionally equivalent, and regardless, they are merely meant to illustrate that foreign courts per-
ceive American punitive damages as penal, not that foreign courts have applied the penal
exception as such.
96. See Vanleenhove, supra note 95, at 353–56, for a summary of the case.
97. Id. at 353–54, 383.
98. Id. at 353.
99. Id. at 353–54.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 356.
102. Duberley v. Gunning (1792) 100 Eng. Rep. 1226, 1226; 4 T.R. 652, 652; see also
discussion supra Section I.A.
103. Wilkes v. Wood (1763) 98 Eng. Rep. 489, 498; Lofft 1, 19; see also discussion supra
Section I.A.
104. Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Grp., Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 432 (2001).
105. For an English translation of the court’s decision, see Lucia Ostoni, Translation, Ital-
ian Rejection of Punitive Damages in a U.S. Judgment, 24 J.L. & Com. 245, 251–62 (2005).
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crash helmet, causing the decedent’s death.106 (The jury did not distinguish
between compensatory and punitive damages in the award, but it was clear
that the damage award was at least partly punitive.)107 The Italian court re-
fused to enforce the judgment altogether because “damages in private law
are not connected to the idea of punishment or to the wrongdoer’s miscon-
duct.”108 It distinguished punitive damages from compensatory damages,
noting that the latter “focus on the victim, relate to his or her loss, and
intend to make him or her whole.”109 Put simply, the court’s decision means
that Duberley damages are available in Italy; Wilkes damages are not.110
It is important not to overstate the European courts’ conclusions. Both
the German and Italian decisions relate to enforceability of judgments, not
choice of law.111 And, of course, the German and Italian positions do noth-
ing to bind American courts. Nevertheless, these foreign cases reveal that the
argument presented here—that punitive damages are penal in the interstate
choice-of-law sense—is not entirely new.
C. Penal Characteristics of Punitive Damages in the United States
American courts and legislatures have also signaled that punitive dam-
ages have penal characteristics. Modern American punitive damages doc-
trine proceeds on the theory that the plaintiff acts at least partially as a
private attorney general, prosecuting the wrong on behalf of her commu-
nity.112 Some states have expressly articulated that punitive damage awards
are grounded in this theory. For example, in Oregon, a plaintiff may recover
only 30 percent of her punitive damage award; the remainder is directed to
the state attorney general.113 In such a case, it is easy to map punitive dam-
ages directly onto Cardozo’s formulation of the penal exception: they
“award[ ] a penalty to the state, or to a public officer in its behalf.”114 Other
106. Id. at 246.
107. Id. at 249 (“[A]bsent a rationale in the Alabama decision, the Italian court could not
understand the criteria upon which the Alabama court had quantified its damages. According
to the Italian court, therefore, it was not possible to exclude that the award at issue had a
punitive nature.”); cf. S. & N.A.R. Co. v. Sullivan, 59 Ala. 272, 278–79 (1877) (“[T]he purpose
and result of the [wrongful death statute] were not a mere solatium to the wounded feelings of
surviving relations, nor compensation for the last earnings of the slain. We think the statute
has a wider aim and scope. It is punitive in its purposes.”).
108. Vanleenhove, supra note 95, at 360.
109. Id.
110. See discussion supra Section I.A.
111. See Patrick J. Borchers, Punitive Damages, Forum Shopping, and the Conflict of Laws,
70 La. L. Rev 529, 530–31 (2010) (explaining the distinction between choice of law and judg-
ment enforceability for punitive damages in the domestic and international contexts).
112. Zipursky, supra note 51, at 1780–83; see Catherine M. Sharkey, Punitive Damages as
Societal Damages, 113 Yale L.J. 347, 372–80 (2003) (describing “split-recovery schemes,” in
which the court directs a portion of the punitive award to the state fisc or another fund on the
theory that punitive damages redress public wrongs).
113. Or. Rev. Stat. § 31.735 (2016).
114. See Loucks v. Standard Oil Co. of N.Y., 120 N.E. 198, 198 (N.Y. 1918).
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states have not been so straightforward about their public-redress theory of
punitive damages. Nevertheless, most states’ punitive damages regimes oper-
ate under some version of this theory.115 This is apparent from the structural
and procedural safeguards that state courts have implemented in the context
of punitive damages.116
For instance, most states have implicitly recognized the quasi-criminal
nature of punitive damages by setting a heightened evidentiary burden for
the conduct requirement.117 Under Kansas law, “[t]o warrant an award of
punitive damages, a party must prove to the trier of fact by clear and con-
vincing evidence that the party against whom the damages are sought acted
with willful or wanton conduct, fraud, or malice.”118 Even more strictly, Col-
orado courts demand that the jury find beyond a reasonable doubt that a
defendant acted “with an evil intent, and with the purpose of injuring the
plaintiff, or with such a wanton and reckless disregard of his rights as evi-
dence a wrongful motive.”119 Colorado is alone in applying a beyond-a-rea-
sonable-doubt standard (a criminal standard) to the conduct requirement
for imposing punitive damages, but thirty states have joined Kansas in ap-
plying a clear-and-convincing-evidence standard.120 This solicitude implic-
itly recognizes the special, “quasi-criminal”121 nature of punitive damages.
When we shift the theoretical framework from a private compensation
model to the private attorney general model, the participants’ roles change.
The plaintiff is no longer just a private party but also a quasi prosecutor.
The defendant is not merely asked to satisfy a debt but compelled to submit
to the whole community’s retribution. As discussed above,122 the jury is no
longer a mere fact finder but also a moral arbiter.123 Given that the partici-
pants take on these quasi-public roles, punitive damages look more like
“vindication of the public justice”124 than “reparation to one aggrieved.”125
Therefore, the antioutsourcing policy of the penal exception ought to apply
in full force.
115. See Zipursky, supra note 51, at 1783–84 (describing states’ “structural and procedural
changes” to punitive damage awards, all of which point toward a theory of semipublic redress).
116. See id.
117. Lori S. Nugent & Robert W. Hammesfahr, Punitive Damages: A State-by-
State Guide to Law and Practice § 7:3 (2012–2013 ed. 2012).
118. First Sav. Bank, F.S.B. v. Frey, 27 P.3d 934, 939 (Kan. Ct. App. 2001) (citing Reeves v.
Carlson, 969 P.2d 252, 255 (Kan. 1998)) (emphasis added).
119. Tri-Aspen Constr. Co. v. Johnson, 714 P.2d 484, 486 (Colo. 1986) (emphasis added)
(quoting Frick v. Abell, 602 P.2d 852, 854 (Colo. 1979)).
120. Nugent & Hammesfahr, supra note 117, § 7:3.
121. Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Grp., Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 432 (2001) (quoting
Pac. Mut. Ins. Life Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 19 (1991) (O’Connor, J., dissenting)).
122. See discussion supra Section II.A.
123. See Cooper, 532 U.S. at 432.
124. Loucks v. Standard Oil Co. of N.Y., 120 N.E. 198, 198 (N.Y. 1918).
125. Id.
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III. Potential Solutions to the Penal Problem
The penal exception does not broadly prevent courts from imposing
punitive damages; it only prevents them from doing so under foreign law.
This Part addresses three potential solutions that courts might use to avoid
the problems presented by punitive damages and the penal exception to for-
eign choice of law. Section III.A considers the possibility that courts engage
in de´pec¸age to ensure that the narrow question of punitive damages is gov-
erned by the law of the forum state, even if other issues are governed by
foreign law. Section III.B suggests that, when faced with the choice between
foreign law and forum law, courts should choose the punitive damages rules
that are most favorable to the defendant. Section III.C offers the simplest
and most logically satisfying solution: when the substance of a case is prima-
rily governed by foreign law, courts should take punitive damages off the
table altogether.
A. Forum Law De´pec¸age
Given that almost all fifty states permit punitive damages in one form or
another,126 it might be forgivable to respond to the penal problem with a
sense of apathy. After all, if a plaintiff is eligible for punitive damages based
on the same conduct requirement and the same burden of proof in both
Arizona and California,127 then it might make little practical difference
whether a court applies Arizona law or California law to the question of
punitive damages. And even if the rules differ slightly—for example, Idaho
law generally permits punitive damage awards up to three times the com-
pensatory award whereas New Jersey law generally caps punitive damage
awards at five times the compensatory award128—it’s not patently offensive
to hold a defendant accountable under the forum-state scheme since both
states’ laws effectively warrant the same kind of judgment.
If we view the penal exception through this pragmatic lens, then a court
could escape the penal problem by simply applying its own law to the nar-
row question of punitive damages while applying foreign law to the other
issues. Splitting up the issues and applying different law to each issue is
known as de´pec¸age; it is a common practice in choice-of-law cases, and the
Second Restatement of Conflicts encourages courts to engage in de´pec¸age in
126. Compare Nugent & Hammesfahr, supra note 117 (noting that only Michigan, Ne-
braska, New Hampshire, and Washington broadly disallow punitive damages), with Helmut
Koziol, Punitive Damages—a European Perspective, 68 La. L. Rev. 741, 743 (2008) (noting that
six U.S. states disallow punitive damages). The discrepancy likely owes to the fact that Massa-
chusetts and Louisiana only allow for punitive damages by statute (rather than by common
law) in narrow circumstances. See Int’l Fid. Ins. Co. v. Wilson, 443 N.E.2d 1308, 1317 n.20
(Mass. 1983); John W. deGravelles & J. Neale deGravelles, Louisiana Punitive Damages—a
Conflict of Traditions, 70 La. L. Rev. 579, 585–87 (2010).
127. See Nugent & Hammesfahr, supra note 117, § 7:3.
128. See Humeston v. Merck & Co., No. ATL-L-2272-03-MT, 2005 WL 6232816 (N.J.
Super. Ct. Law Div. Sept. 12, 2005).
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tort cases.129 For instance, in Erny v. Estate of Merola,130 the New Jersey Su-
preme Court ruled that although New Jersey law should have applied with
respect to the issue of comparative negligence, New York law should have
applied to the question of joint and several liability.131
Provided that a court applies the law of its own jurisdiction (“forum law”
or “lex fori”)132 to the question of punitive damages, then it arguably escapes
the penal problem. For example, in a wrongful-death action, an Arizona
court could apply Colorado law for the standard of liability and Arizona law
for punitive damages. The Arizona Supreme Court endorsed a similar ap-
proach in 1985 in Bryant v. Silverman.133 The court asserted that Arizona
had the “greatest interest” in the question of punitive damages.134
More recently, a court in New Jersey expressed a sentiment that sounded
like a step toward forum law de´pec¸age for punitive damage awards, at least in
the context of products liability.135 In Humeston v. Merck,136 the New Jersey
state trial court determined that it would apply its own law to the punitive
damages question (rather than Idaho’s law) at least in part because New
Jersey had a “commitment to the victims of defective products,” and a “rec-
ognition that the place where a product manufactured [in New Jersey] ulti-
mately comes to rest and cause injury is a matter of pure fortuity.”137
The forum law decisions in Bryant and Humeston were not explicitly
grounded in the penal exception, but both decisions arguably provided
cover for the courts to assess punitive damages without running afoul of the
penal exception. Even if the Arizona and New Jersey courts did punish the
defendant by imposing punitive damages, at least they did so under their
own laws. Courts do not apply foreign states’ penal laws,138 but of course
they are free to apply their own penal laws.
129. See Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 145(1) cmt. d (Am. Law. Inst.
1971) (“Each issue is to receive separate [choice-of-law] consideration if it is one which would
be resolved differently under the local law rule of two or more of the potentially interested
states.”); id. § 146 (“In an action for a personal injury, the local law of the state where the
injury occurred determines the rights and liabilities of the parties, unless, with respect to the
particular issue, some other state has a more significant relationship . . . to the occurrence and
the parties, in which event the local law of the other state will be applied.” (emphasis added)).
130. 792 A.2d 1208, 1214 (N.J. 2002).
131. Erny, 792 A.2d at 1221.
132. “The law of the forum; the law of the jurisdiction where the case is pending . . . .” Lex
fori, Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014).
133. 703 P.2d 1190, 1193 n.1 (Ariz. 1985); see Humeston, 2005 WL 6232816 (performing
separate choice-of-law analyses on three discrete issues: (1) consumer fraud, (2) failure to
warn, and (3) punitive damages); see also Minebea Co. v. Papst, 377 F. Supp. 2d 34, 40 (D.D.C.
2005) (“The issue of punitive damages is distinct from that of liability for the underlying
claims, however, and choice of law for that issue must be analyzed separately.”).
134. Bryant, 703 P.2d at 1197.
135. See Humeston, 2005 WL 6232816.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 21 (quoting Gantes v. Kason Corp., 679 A.2d 106, 113 n.2 (N.J. 1996)).
138. The Antelope, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 66, 123 (1825).
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Forum law de´pec¸age is appealing on a superficial level, but it fails to
satisfy the more pressing theoretical problem presented by extraterritorial
punitive damages. To its credit, it only permits a jury to “morally condemn”
a defendant within the community’s own moral framework. But even
though the Arizona court in Bryant maneuvered to Arizona law for the
question of punitive damages, it withheld judgment on which law would
govern the defendants’ liability, and it suggested that different state laws
might apply to different portions of the case.139 The same could never hap-
pen in a criminal context. An Arizona court would never impose criminal
liability on a defendant for violating a Colorado criminal statute, even if it
based its sentencing decision on Arizona’s sentencing guidelines. Indeed, the
Supreme Court has held that “[i]t would be a manifest incongruity for one
sovereignty to punish a person for an offence committed against the laws of
another sovereignty.”140
A more practical problem with indiscriminate forum law de´pec¸age is
that it would often subject the defendant to harsh punitive standards that
she otherwise would have avoided. If punitive damages are penal, then it
makes little sense for the forum court to punish the defendant even more
harshly than it would under the more appropriate law. For example, in
wrongful-death lawsuits, Colorado caps punitive damages at $500,000, but
Massachusetts does not.141 If a Massachusetts court were to apply forum law
to the question of punitive damages, the defendant would shoulder a greater
risk than if the court were to manage the entire case under Colorado law.
Under the guise of fairness to the defendant, the court would expose the
defendant to even greater liability.
B. Choice-of-Law Presumption in Favor of the Defendant
Rather than applying forum law indiscriminately to questions about pu-
nitive damages, courts could employ a more nuanced analysis that empha-
sizes fairness over formalism. Because the penal exception is at least partially
inspired by ideas of notice and fairness to defendants,142 courts could per-
form their choice-of-law analyses in a way that favors defendants. When
faced with a choice between two or more states’ punitive damages laws,
139. Cf. Bryant v. Silverman, 703 P.2d 1190, 1193 n.1 (Ariz. 1985) (explaining that the
court would engage in de´pec¸age to determine the most appropriate law for damages).
140. Huntington v. Attrill, 146 U.S. 657, 672 (1892) (quoting Ex parte Bridges, 4 F. Cas.
98, 105 (C.C.N.D. Ga. 1875) (No. 1,862)).
141. Ogburn-Sisneros v. Fresenius Med. Care Holdings, Inc., No. 2013-05050, 2015 WL
6437773, at *6 (Mass. Super. Ct. Oct. 19, 2015).
142. See Huntington v. Atrill, 146 U.S. 657, 672 (1892) (“It would be a manifest incon-
gruity for one sovereignty to punish a person for an offence committed against the laws of
another sovereignty.”); discussion supra Introduction; cf. Small v. United States, 544 U.S. 385,
389 (2005) (declining to recognize a conviction in a Japanese court for purposes of a multiple-
conviction penalty, explaining that foreign legal systems are sometimes “inconsistent with an
American understanding of fairness”).
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courts could default to the most lenient available law.143 This would resem-
ble the ordinary principle that, in the face of a legal ambiguity, “a tie goes to
the defendant.”144
In Ogburn-Sisneros v. Fresenius, a Massachusetts court applied the more
lenient Colorado law to the punitive damages question in a wrongful death
lawsuit.145 It stated, “The fact that . . . Colorado limits the amount of the
punitive damages award, while Massachusetts does not, is insufficient to es-
tablish that Massachusetts has a greater interest in applying its own law to
this case.”146 Similar facts led to a similar conclusion in Zimmerman v.
Novartis.147 In that case, a Maryland federal court (sitting in diversity) held
that New Jersey law should apply to punitive damages even though Mary-
land law applied to questions of liability and compensatory damages.148 New
Jersey law capped punitive damages at five times the amount of the compen-
satory award; Maryland imposed no cap on punitive damages.149 The court
applied the defendant-friendly New Jersey law in part on the ground that
“[t]he Defendant, having its principal place of business in New Jersey, has a
justified expectation of being subject to New Jersey law for punitive
damages.”150
Neither the Ogburn-Sisneros court nor the Zimmerman court invoked
the penal exception, but both courts resolved the punitive damages choice-
of-law question in favor of the defendant.151 Although neither court articu-
lated a rule that courts should always resolve such questions in favor of the
defendant, either could have. At least in part, the spirit underlying the penal
exception is notice and fairness to the defendant.152 For courts that recognize
that punitive damages are inherently penal but are unwilling to abandon
143. This approach would still require courts to engage in some qualitative analysis about
the defendant’s relationship to her chosen law. If courts were to defer to defendants’ choice-of-
law arguments without serious scrutiny, it seems likely that defendants would magically pro-
duce contacts with Michigan, Nebraska, New Hampshire, and Washington, all of which
broadly prohibit punitive damages. See Nugent & Hammesfahr, supra note 117, § 7:3.
Courts would still need to scrutinize those arguments to determine whether or not they are
legitimate.
144. See Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 330 (2007) (Scalia, J.,
concurring in the judgment).
145. Ogburn-Sisneros, 2015 WL 6437773, at *1.
146. Id. at *6 n.12; see also Minebea Co. v. Papst, 377 F. Supp. 2d 34, 40–42 (D.D.C. 2005)
(holding that German law, which disallows punitive damages, should apply rather than New
York law).
147. 889 F. Supp. 2d 757, 762–63 (D. Md. 2012).
148. Zimmerman, 889 F. Supp. 2d at 761–63.
149. Id. at 760 & n.2.
150. Id. at 764 (quoting Talley v. Novartis Pharm. Corp., No. 3:08-CV-361-GCM, 2011
WL 2559974, at *4 (W.D.N.C. June 28, 2011)).
151. The decisions were favorable to the defendants only in a relative sense. Of course, the
decisions would have been even more favorable to the defendants if the courts had rejected
punitive damages altogether. See discussion infra Section III.C.
152. See Huntington v. Atrill, 146 U.S. 657, 672 (1892) (quoting Ex parte Bridges, 4 F.
Cas. 98, 105 (C.C.N.D. Ga. 1875) (No. 1,862)) (“It would be a manifest incongruity for one
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extraterritorial punitive damages altogether, Ogburn-Sisneros and Zimmer-
man suggest a middle ground. That is, if a court is determined to impose
punitive damages on a defendant even when other states’ laws apply to the
merits of the action, it could still ensure that the defendant is not
overpunished.
Although this defendant-favorability approach has the relative advan-
tage of fairness to the defendant, it is difficult to defend on principle. There
is no quasi-penal quasi exception. If punitive damages are penal, then courts
have no business imposing them under foreign law. If they are not penal,
then a court should apply whatever law is most appropriate to the parties
and the facts of the case,153 regardless of which law is more lenient. Even if it
offers some practical benefit or soothes a court’s conscience, this defendant-
favorability approach does little to resolve the theoretical dissonance inher-
ent in imposing punitive damages under foreign substantive law.
C. Total Exclusion of Punitive Damages Outside the Forum Law
Forum law de´pec¸age for punitive damages is administrable but unfair.154
A presumption in favor of the defendant’s choice-of-law is fairer but un-
principled.155 In order to apply law in a way that is principled, fair to the
defendant, and easily administrable, courts should wholly reject punitive
damages when they impose liability under foreign substantive law. Under
this approach, if a court applies foreign substantive law to the merits of the
case, then the plaintiff becomes automatically ineligible for punitive dam-
ages. As far as punitive damages are concerned, this approach would collapse
the choice-of-law question into the jurisdictional question, mirroring the
criminal law approach.156 In the criminal context, a court will not take juris-
diction over a case unless it will apply its own law to the merits. Under this
proposed approach, a court would behave the same way with respect to pu-
nitive damages.
This total-exclusion approach is intuitive, if blunt. If punitive damages
are penal, then there is no room for middle ground. A court would never
allow a foreign prosecutor to append a criminal allegation to a civil case; it
would dismiss criminal allegations without prejudice, and the prosecutor
would pursue the matter in the more appropriate forum. Similarly, in the
civil context, a court could adjudicate the entire nonpunitive portion of a
case, then dismiss the plaintiff’s punitive claims either with or without
sovereignty to punish a person for an offence committed against the laws of another sover-
eignty.”); discussion supra Introduction; cf. Small v. United States, 544 U.S. 385, 389 (2005)
(referring to a uniquely “American understanding of fairness”).
153. See Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 145(1) (Am. Law Inst. 1971).
154. See discussion supra Section III.A.
155. See discussion supra Section III.B.
156. See Symeonides, supra note 57, at 82–83 (“Strictly speaking, in the area of criminal
law, there is no choice-of-law question—it is merged into the jurisdictional question. A state
either has jurisdiction, in which case it applies its own law, or lacks jurisdiction, in which case
it would ordinarily extradite the defendant to a state with proper jurisdiction.”).
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prejudice.157 If a court dismisses the punitive claims without prejudice, then
the plaintiff would theoretically be free to pursue punitive damages in a
more appropriate jurisdiction.158
At least one court in Nebraska has been prepared to apply this total-
exclusion approach.159 In Estate of Donahue ex rel. Brown v. Wel-Life at Papil-
lion, Inc., a Nebraska plaintiff sued a South Dakota defendant in a Nebraska
court, alleging wrongful death,160 and the court applied the substantive law
of South Dakota.161 South Dakota law allows for punitive damages; Nebraska
law rejects them.162 Although it applied South Dakota law to the substance of
the wrongful-death claim, it stated:
Defendants are correct in pointing out that Nebraska courts are not re-
quired, or even necessarily permitted, to apply damages law from another
state. Punitive damages may be permitted in Nebraska in cases . . . [that]
utilize punitive damages from federal statutes. However, the present case is
in state court, does not involve federal statutes, and the only other law
referenced is that of South Dakota.163
It continued, “There is no exception to the rule even when one party is from
another state . . . .”164 One could characterize the court’s approach as total
exclusion or forum law de´pec¸age;165 either way, the result was that the court
rejected the plaintiff’s request to impose punitive damages under or along-
side foreign substantive law.
It is true that this total-exclusion approach would dramatically reduce
the availability of punitive damages for injured plaintiffs. But the Supreme
157. See id. at 83.
158. It is not clear whether another court would entertain a claim for punitive damages
where the liability portion of the case is already res judicata. To my knowledge, it would be a
novel request.
159. See Estate of Donahue ex rel. Brown v. Wel-Life at Papillion, Inc., No. 1057463, 2009
WL 8613470 (Neb. Dist. Ct. Apr. 30, 2009). The case ultimately resulted in a jury verdict for
the defendant, so the question of punitive damages was moot. Judgment, Estate of Donahue ex
rel. Brown v. Wel-Life at Papillion, Inc., No. 1057463 (Neb. Dist. Ct. Dec. 14, 2009), 2009 WL
8613471.
160. Judgment, supra note 159.
161. See Plaintiff’s Response to Defendants’ Motion to Strike South Dakota Punitive Dam-
age Claim, Estate of Donahue ex rel. Brown v. Wel-Life at Papillion, Inc., No. 1057463 (Neb.
Dist. Ct. Oct. 27, 2008), 2008 WL 8830014.
162. S.D. Codified Laws § 21-3-2 (2004) (“[T]he jury, in addition to the actual damage,
may give damages for the sake of example, and by way of punishing the defendant.”); Distinc-
tive Printing & Packaging Co. v. Cox, 443 N.W.2d 566, 574 (Neb. 1989) (“[P]unitive, vindic-
tive, or exemplary damages contravene [Nebraska’s constitution], and thus are not allowed in
this jurisdiction.”).
163. Estate of Donahue, 2009 WL 8613470.
164. Id.
165. See discussion supra Section III.A.
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Court has been clear: “Punitive damages are not compensation for in-
jury,”166 and “[p]unitive damages are specifically designed to exact punish-
ment in excess of actual harm.”167 Plaintiffs are not entitled to punitive
damages unless the applicable law so entitles them; they merely receive the
benefit of the defendant’s punishment as a consequence of moral luck.
Plaintiffs are no more entitled to punitive damage awards than individual
prosecutors are entitled to criminal fines. This approach would come as a
disappointment to plaintiffs, but not as an injustice.
Arguably, however, plaintiffs from certain states are entitled to punitive
damage awards as a matter of legal right, not just moral luck. California law,
for instance, provides for punitive damage awards by statute.168 But a Cali-
fornia plaintiff only enjoys that legal right to the extent that California law
applies in the first place. If a court (in California or elsewhere) applies non-
California law, that statutory entitlement dissolves. But even if a Nevada
court applies California substantive law to the merits of a case, it should
come as no great surprise that the Nevada court would judiciously avoid the
portions of California law that would lead it to punish the defendant. Even if
a California plaintiff is in some sense “entitled” to a punitive damage award,
a Nevada court should honor interstate choice-of-law rules before honoring
the plaintiff’s foreign “entitlement.”
Some might also argue that the total-exclusion approach would incen-
tivize forum shopping, but more likely, it would simply encourage plaintiffs
to seek out the most appropriate forum. If state courts resolved to impose
punitive damages only when applying their own substantive law, then plain-
tiffs would be inclined to file suit in the forum most likely to apply its own
law. In other words, the total-exclusion approach would encourage plaintiffs
to seek the jurisdiction with the “most significant relationship” to the parties
and the facts of the case (to the extent that courts act predictably in their
choice-of-law analyses).169 If this proposed approach to punitive damages
and choice of law encourages forum shopping, it is the right kind of forum
shopping.
On the flip side, the total-exclusion approach would incentivize defend-
ants to argue their way out of the forum in order to avoid punitive damages.
But a closer look at the forum non conveniens170 doctrine reveals that courts
166. Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Grp., Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 432 (2001) (quoting
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 350 (1974)).
167. Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 54 (1991)
(O’Connor, J., dissenting)).
168. Cal. Civ. Code § 3294 (West 2016).
169. See Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 145 (Am. Law Inst. 1971)
170. “The doctrine that an appropriate forum—even though competent under the law—
may divest itself of jurisdiction if, for the convenience of the litigants and the witnesses, it
appears that the action should proceed in another forum in which the action might also have
been properly brought in the first place.” Forum non conveniens, Black’s Law Dictionary
(10th ed. 2014).
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are well equipped to respond to such cunning. A state court will only dis-
miss a case under forum non conveniens if it serves the interests of justice.171
The Supreme Court provided guidance in Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno: “If the
remedy provided by the alternative forum is so clearly inadequate or unsatis-
factory that it is no remedy at all . . . the [trial] court may conclude that
dismissal would not be in the interests of justice”172 and therefore deny the
defendant’s motion to dismiss. After all, forum non conveniens is designed
“to avoid the oppression or vexation that might result from automatically
honoring plaintiff’s forum choice.”173 If a defendant successfully argues her
way out of the forum and thereby escapes punitive damages, then by impli-
cation, it would likely have been “oppress[ive]” and “vex[ing]” to honor the
plaintiff’s forum choice (and allow punitive damages) in the first place.174
Another counterargument to total exclusion is that the American aver-
sion175 to the renvoi176 doctrine, which leaves some civil cases without a nat-
ural jurisdictional home. Renvoi means “sending back”;177 it occurs when the
forum court looks to a foreign state’s choice-of-law rules, which in turn
might point back to the law of the forum or to another state’s law.178 Avoid-
ing renvoi means that a Mississippi court might apply Alabama substantive
law to a given case even though an Alabama court, under its normal choice-
of-law principles, would not apply its own law.179 Because state courts vary
in their approaches to choice of law, there are some cases in which no juris-
diction where the plaintiff may file suit would apply its own substantive
law.180 Under the total-exclusion approach, that means that plaintiffs in such
cases would find themselves altogether ineligible for punitive damages.
There are two important rebuttals to this problem. First, plaintiffs are
not entitled to punitive damages unless the applicable law so entitles them.181
If a plaintiff is so unlucky as to find herself without a jurisdiction that will
apply forum law (and therefore, punitive damages), then that is unfortunate
but not unjust. Second, to the extent it is a problem at all, the renvoi prob-
lem is a choice-of-law problem, not a punitive damages problem. If courts
171. Cf. Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 254 (1981).
172. Id.
173. Jack H. Friedenthal et al., Civil Procedure § 2.17, at 87–88 (5th ed. 2015).
174. See id.
175. See Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 145 cmt. h (Am. Law Inst.
1971).
176. “The doctrine under which a court, in resorting to foreign law, also adopts the for-
eign law’s conflict-of-laws principles, which may in turn refer the court back to the law of the
forum.” Renvoi, Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014).
177. Id.
178. See Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 145 cmt. h (Am. Law Inst.
1971).
179. For a narrative illustration of the renvoi problem, see Jeffrey Jackson et al., Mis-
sissippi Civil Procedure § 4:16 (2017).
180. See id.
181. See supra text accompanying and following note 168.
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are bothered that some civil cases have no natural home (in which jurisdic-
tion and choice of law align), then they should solve the renvoi problem.
Until that day, courts should not ignore the penal exception simply because
they will inevitably distribute punitive damages unevenly.
Perhaps the most compelling argument against the total-exclusion ap-
proach is based on the notion that the approach could potentially strip the
state where the wrong occurred of its inherent power to punish the defen-
dant. Imagine that a New York defendant defrauds a New York plaintiff in
Pennsylvania. Isn’t a Pennsylvania court inherently empowered to punish
that defendant by imposing punitive damages (under either Pennsylvania or
New York law) even if New York law is most appropriate for the substance of
the fraud claim? This is probably the most forgivable application of punitive
damages under foreign law because Pennsylvania can claim a strong policy
interest in deterring conduct that occurs within its own borders. Neverthe-
less, such punishment violates the penal exception. A Pennsylvania court
should not ask a Pennsylvania jury to express its conscience through New
York law. In any event, neither Pennsylvania nor the plaintiff is helpless in
this scenario. If Pennsylvania wants to punish the defendant for fraud, it
may do so under its criminal law. If the plaintiff wants to secure a punitive
damage award, she can pursue that award in a New York court.
The total-exclusion approach raises (at least) one more question: If
courts can only apply punitive damages under forum law, won’t they alter
their choice-of-law analyses in order to apply forum law more often? Per-
haps.182 Choice-of-law rules in state courts are all over the map, and uni-
formity is not on the horizon.183 As an empirical matter, state judiciaries
exhibit a strong preference for their own substantive law anyway,184 whether
or not judges admit it openly.185 Some scholars have advocated for a univer-
sal presumption of forum law in choice-of-law analysis,186 and several state
courts already employ such an approach.187 If the total-exclusion approach
pushes courts to apply forum law more often than they otherwise would, it
182. As mentioned in the Introduction to this Note, “[s]tate court judges are about twice
as likely to choose law that favors the plaintiff if the plaintiff is local and the defendant is out-
of-state than vice vers[a].” Klerman, supra note 13, at 2.
183. Ralph U. Whitten, U.S. Conflict-of-Laws Doctrine and Forum Shopping, International
and Domestic (Revisited), 37 Tex. Int’l L.J. 559, 582 (2002) (“[A]chieving uniformity in
choice-of-law approaches among the states is difficult. Arriving at a proper choice-of-law
methodology has eluded the best minds of our profession and promises to continue to do
so.”); see also id. at 579 (“Scholars generally concede that U.S. choice-of-law doctrine is a
mess.”).
184. See id. at 566. Michigan, for example, applies a lex fori presumption in all choice-of-
law analyses: “[W]e will apply Michigan law unless a ‘rational reason’ to do otherwise exists.”
Sutherland v. Kennington Truck Serv., Ltd., 562 N.W.2d 466, 471 (Mich. 1997).
185. In his article, Professor Whitten suggests that many courts employ “dishonest” rea-
soning in order to arrive at “pro-forum, pro-recovery, pro-local party recovery” substantive
law. Whitten, supra note 183, at 569.
186. See generally Albert A. Ehrenzweig, The Lex Fori—Basic Rule in the Conflict of Laws,
58 Mich. L. Rev. 637 (1960); Whitten, supra note 183.
187. See supra notes 184–186 and accompanying text.
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would not devastate the state judiciary systems. In fact, it might even lead
them toward a more understandable, more uniform approach to choice-of-
law analysis in general.
Conclusion
The theory of punitive damages in American courts has shifted, and in
the modern landscape, it is inappropriate for state courts to impose punitive
damages under foreign substantive law. Whereas punitive damages perhaps
once functioned to compensate plaintiffs for invisible, nonpecuniary inju-
ries, they now serve to express “moral condemnation”188 and “social out-
rage.”189 They are assessed to satisfy the community’s conscience, not to
compensate the plaintiff’s injury. They no longer function as “reparation to
one aggrieved,” but instead as “vindication of the public justice.”190 But
“[t]he Courts of no country execute the penal laws of another.”191 When a
state court determines that its own substantive law is not the most appropri-
ate law for the merits of a case, then it violates the penal exception by im-
posing punitive damages.
Ultimately, if courts accept the theory that punitive damages are penal,
then they should not impose them under or alongside foreign substantive
law. Courts might technically escape the penal problem by implementing
forum law de´pec¸age192 or assuage their consciences by exercising a choice-of-
law presumption in favor of the defendant with respect to punitive dam-
ages.193 But total exclusion of punitive damages under foreign substantive
law is the only solution that is sound in theory and practice.194 It is the
responsibility of the courts to ensure that penal laws extend no further than
their own state borders. Punitive damages should be out of reach when state
courts do not apply forum law.
188. Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Grp., Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 432 (2001).
189. Sunstein et al., supra note 18, at 2075.
190. Loucks v. Standard Oil Co. of N.Y., 120 N.E. 198, 198 (N.Y. 1918).
191. The Antelope, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 66, 123 (1825).
192. See discussion supra Section III.A.
193. See discussion supra Section III.B.
194. See discussion supra Section III.C.
